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Abstract
We use a combination of ex-ante and ex-post evaluation methods to evaluate
a major welfare policy implemented in France in 1989. The policy granted an
allowance (the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, RMI, of up to 45% of the French
full time minimum wage) to every individual above age 25 and below a threshold
household income. The ex-post evaluation relies on the speci￿city of the Eastern
part of France. In Alsace-Moselle, since 1908 and during German occupancy, res-
idents bene￿ted from a very similar transfer system (called ￿Aide Sociale￿). Our
estimates, based on double and triple di￿erences, show that the RMI policy was
associated with: a 3% fall in employment (among unskilled workers 25-55 years
old), leading to an estimated loss of 328 000 jobs; a decline in the job-access
rate; and a 5-month increase in the average duration of unemployment. We ￿nd
considerably larger disincentive e￿ects for single parents. In a second step, we
build and calibrate a matching model with endogenous job search e￿ort, using the
di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimates. It predicts that, if a 38% implicit tax rate had
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1been maintained as in the 2007 reform (RSA), instead of a 100% implicit tax rate
due to the RMI, the increase in unemployment would have been approximately
half of its actual value, and the increase in the duration of unemployment would
have been limited to only 2.5 months.
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21 Introduction
Many European countries as well as some US states have experimented with giving
direct cash transfers to the poorest families and individuals in society. These welfare
policies are thought to be a straightforward way of alleviating poverty and, to some
extent, the side e￿ects of poverty, such as crime, underinvestment in education, and
health problems.
However, these bene￿ts may come at a cost. Such policies may cause disincentive
e￿ects with respect to employment and labor market participation. Transferring cash to
poor households may discourage job search e￿orts and undermine work ethic. Answering
these questions means understanding the negative income e￿ect in labour supply curves,
which several studies ￿nd evidence to support (see the comprehensive survey by Blundell
and McCurdy 1999.)3.
In 1989, under the presidency of Fran￿ois Mitterrand, Michel Rocard’s socialist gov-
ernment passed the RMI law (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion), which provided income
support to all individuals above age 25 whose income fell below a certain threshold. The
amount was initially 2000 French Francs (about 300 euros) for a single person, roughly
40% of the gross monthly minimum wage at the time (4,961.84 FF or about 800 euros),
with additional bene￿ts per dependent person in the household. Surprisingly, at the time
of the 1989 reform and in subsequent years, few attempts have been made to evaluate
the e￿ects of the RMI on employment and unemployment. This may be explained by
the lack of appropriate data, the absence of a convincing identi￿cation strategy, some
theoretical shortcomings, and perhaps politics’ disinterest in scienti￿c arguments 4.
3During the 1980’s, policies in many states and countries moved from welfare to workfare, where
transfers are made conditional on working. Examples of workfare policies are either tax credits (such as
the earned income tax credit (EITC) in the US or the WTC in the UK) or wage subsidies adding up to
the net wage received by employers (such as the Self-Su￿ciency project in Canada). The evaluation of
these policies still amounts to knowledge of labor supply elasticities, but now the uncompensated labor
supply elasticities with respect to wages must be estimated.
4Many studies had to overcome the lack of information about eligibility of potential RMI recipients
and rely on proxies instead. The di￿culty of obtaining a clear identi￿cation strategy is due to the fact
that France is a centralized country where laws are implemented all over the territory: the design of
appropriate control groups which could serve as counterfactuals, such as una￿ected regions, is there-
fore di￿cult. The e￿ects of major labor policies in France such as minimum wage changes, worktime
reduction or payroll tax exemptions had to rely on creatively chosen control groups, for instance using
variations in ￿rm size, such as CrØpon and Kramarz (2002) or CrØpon et al. (2004). With regard to
the lack of a fully-developed theory adapted to European labor markets, it is ackowledged that the
measurement of disincentive e￿ects of welfare policies traditionally relies on compensated and uncom-
pensated elasticities of labor supply with respect to earnings, e.g. see Blundell and McCurdy (1999).
However, in Continental Europe, and in France in particular, the existence of high rates of involuntary
unemployment among the potential recipients implies that more complex models of labor supply are
needed. Those models should take into account the existence of several labor market states, and in
particular the existence of unemployment. Blundell and Mc Curdy (1999, pp 1686 to 1772) argued that
the literature lacks a proper modelling of the process of job search and job matching.
3In this paper, we attempt to overcome these many methodological di￿culties in
two ways. First, we show that regional variance can in fact be found in France. This
variance comes not from the implementation of the RMI law, but instead from the pre-
1989 situation. In particular, we make use of an interesting feature of French institutions:
the Northeastern part of France (a region, Alsace, and a sub-region or ￿dØpartement￿,
Moselle) has had di￿erent institutions from the rest of the country since the end of the
XIXth century. In particular, Alsace-Moselle has had a di￿erent social security system.
This unique historical accident allows us to use a di￿erence-in-di￿erences framework to
evaluate the reforms that were implemented di￿erently in the rest of France. Alsace-
Moselle can serve as a control group, while the rest of France can be used as the treatment
group5.
Applying this strategy, based on double and triple di￿erence estimates to control
for di￿erent regional trends, we investigate the employment, unemployment and labor
force participation e￿ects of RMI, as well as the e￿ects on job search and wages. We
include a number of robustness checks and falsi￿cation exercises. We then calibrate
key parameters of an extension of the three-state labor market model, such that the
disincentive e￿ects, according to the model and the di￿erence-in-di￿erences approach,
are the same. Finally, we use the calibrated model to run a number of counterfactual
policies, in particular the recent RSA reform. If that reform had been implemented
counterfactually in 1989, our model suggests that the employment losses would have
been reduced by 50 percent.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we outline the RMI experiment
in France, the regional implementation in Alsace-Moselle and additional local social
policies, and brie￿y survey earlier policy evaluations of it. In Section 3, we describe
the data and the empirical methodology. In Section 4, we provide the main employment
and unemployment results and various additional robustness checks. In Section 5, we
develop a job search model with social transfers and general equilibrium e￿ects in order
to replicate the various possible channels through which the RMI may a￿ect employment
and unemployment. We reach a number of predictions that ￿t the empirical ￿ndings.
In Section 6, we then use the di￿erence-in-di￿erences results of Section 4 to calibrate
our model, and we run a number of counterfactual experiments. Section 7 concludes.
5This identi￿cation strategy was successfully applied to the evaluation of another policy, the e￿ects
of the 35h workweek reform in 1998 in Chemin and Wasmer (2009).
4Figure 1: Bene￿ciaries of the RMI
2 Description of the policy and its regional implemen-
tation
2.1 The RMI: context and design
In the early 80’s, after the second oil shock of 1979, France realized it was now per-
mamently a￿ected by mass unemployment and in particular long-term unemployment.
Poverty rose and in 1985, an initiative called ￿Restaurant du Coeur￿ was launched by
a famous humorist and actor (Coluche) to provide free food to families in the need. In
French politics, the need of a better safety net became obvious. In 1989, the French
Parliament voted in favor of the RMI (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion): any citizen above
25 years old, living in a household earning less than a given income threshold, became
eligible for an allowance amounting to a large fraction of the minimum legal wage 6.
RMI recipients received 2000 French Francs (FF hereafter), that is 40% of the monthly
full-time gross minimum wage at the time. The allowance was increased by 50% for
a two-persons household and 30% for each additional dependent person. Almost all
members of the Parliament (left and right) voted in favor of the law 7. Figure 1 shows
that take-up was gradual among bene￿ciairies, with approximately 1.25 million people
bene￿ting from the RMI in 2006.
With the allowance came the requirement to sign an insertion contract (￿Contrat
d’Insertion￿), which speci￿ed concrete steps taken by the bene￿ciary to ￿nd a job (coun-
selling, training program, support from national employment agencies and local public
administration). In defending the law on Oct. 4, 1989, Minister Claude Evin thus
described the two objectives of the reform: solidarity (in France, at the time, 600 000
long-term unemployed had income less than 2000 FF and 400 000 of them were no longer
6Law n 88-1088, December First 1988.
7Only three opposed and 24 abstained, out of 585 members of the Parliament.
5covered by social security); and individual responsibility (the ￿Contrat d’Insertion￿ aimed
at reinserting individuals into the labor market). The RMI policy was initially presented
as a mix of welfare and workfare: the transfer would be made conditional on an objective
of ’insertion’ into employment and society, thanks to counselling, provision of incentives
and housing allowance.
However, the insertion contract was not always enforced. In fact, only 60 percent of
recipients signed (Zoyem, 2001). The President of the Parliament Commission in charge
of the examination of the law, MP Jean-Michel Belorgey, even argued that it would be
unthinkable to cut bene￿ts to those unable to get a job, given that failure to ￿nd work
may be due to ￿de￿ciencies of the public administration￿ in re-inserting recipients into
the labor market.
Several academic works, including Gurgand and Margolis (2001, 2005), pointed out
that the gains from activity may be small for many RMI recipients. This phenomenon
is known as a poverty trap: that is, an implicit marginal tax rate of 100%, or even
higher, for RMI recipients who obtain a job. In addition, jobs taken by RMI recipients
were generally low-paying, on average 610 euros per month according to Rioux (2001).
Piketty (1998) highlighted women’s high labor supply elasticities and the disincentive
e￿ects of policies such as RMI and family transfers. In an e￿ort to mitigate this, partial
reforms were implemented in 1998, 2000 and 2001 (HagnØrØ and Trannoy, 2001) to
raise the incentives to work. Despite the warnings, the RMI rapidly became the largest
welfare program in France: in December 2007, the RMI was distributed to 1.16 million
recipients, roughly the total number of unemployed workers.
Policy debates gradually came to the consensus that the ￿insertion component￿ of
RMI had not succeeded, even though few explicitly recognized the disincentive e￿ects.
In theory, such e￿ects should exist: the RMI was indeed a ￿di￿erential allowance￿. After
a transition period, all income from activity led to an equivalent decrease in the amount
of the allowance, leading to a 100% e￿ective marginal tax rate. In some cases, the
marginal hours worked would reduce the income of RMI recipients, given the cumulated
loss of RMI and other social transfers. To limit the disincentive e￿ects of this 100%
implicit marginal tax rate of labor income, which in some cases would be even larger
due to the loss of additional social transfers (free public transportation in some regions
such as Ile de France, rebates of 10 euros on monthly telephone bills in France Telecom,
and so on), the initial transition period during which RMI and labor incomes could be
cumulated was then extended from 3 months to 12 months in the 2000’s. According to
HagnerØ et Trannoy (2001), after 1998, the ￿rst three months of labor income would not
be counted into the determination of the level of RMI, and the next 9 months would be
counted with a rebate of 50%, leading to a smaller e￿ective marginal tax rate during this
transition period. Nevertheless, after the one year period, the marginal rate of taxation
would increase again to 100%.
In 2007, another major reform led by Martin Hirsch (Haut Commissaire aux Solidar-
itØs Actives) took stock of this debate and introduced better incentives: for the marginal
6hours worked, the new scheme (RSA, standing for Revenu de SolidaritØ Active) trans-
formed each additional euro of labor income into 0.62 euro of additional net income,
equivalent to a much lower 38% e￿ective marginal tax rate. The RSA combined the
RMI (RSA socle) and a complement, proportional to the additional labor income ( RSA
chapeau).
2.2 Alsace-Moselle : ￿aide sociale￿
A system (￿aide sociale￿) similar to the RMI, at the city level, was already in place
in Alsace Moselle. Since 1908, all municipalities in Alsace-Moselle were required to
provide assistance to impoverished citizens 8. For instance, in the main city in Alsace
(Strasbourg), the allowance for a single eligible person amounts to 65% of the gross
minimum wage (Kintz, 1989). It was also more generous than the RMI in that it
concerned all individuals above 16 years old 9.
After the introduction of the French RMI in 1989, municipalities in Alsace-Moselle
may still provide an allowance to poor individuals, but this allowance reduces the RMI
given by the state (Woehrling, 2002) 10. Consequently, after 1989, cities in Alsace Moselle
have a direct incentive to stop providing this ￿aide sociale￿, as emphasized by Woehrling
(2002). Poor individuals qualify for welfare payments in Alsace Moselle and the rest of
France after 1989, but only in Alsace Moselle before 1989. This provides an opportunity
for a di￿erence-in-di￿erence analysis before and after 1988, between Alsace Moselle and
the rest of France, in order to evaluate the impact of the RMI.
Of course, one may argue that Alsace-Moselle is di￿erent due to the existence of
other regional speci￿cities. In Figure 2, Alsace-Moselle is represented by the three
￿dØpartements￿ labeled 57, 68 and 67. They are in the top east corner of France, and
happen to be the only to be ones with a border with Germany.
This has at least one undesirable consequence for the econometric identi￿cation:
since the pattern of trade between Germany and France is not homogeneous on French
8￿Lois locales des 30 mai 1908 et du 8 novembre 1909￿.
http://www.lexisnexis.com/fr/droit/search/runRemoteLink.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4090933869
&homeCsi=303228&A=0.7883780303835484&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&dpsi=0ARX
&remotekey1=DOC-ID&remotekey2=685_EN_AL0_64685FASCICULEEN_1_PRO_018548
&service=DOC-ID&origdpsi=0ARX&level=1&duRemote=true. French central state never abolished
the various local social laws including this speci￿c one, and even recognized o￿cially the Alsace-Moselle
speci￿city in a law text in 1924. See Chemin and Wasmer (2009).
9According to Kintz (1989), in Strasbourg there are 13 000 persons coveredby the subsidies for an
amount of near 3 millions euros. In some other cities, e.g. Colmar, in-kind allowances are distributed to
those in need. A decree-law from 1938 excluded foreigners. This disposition, according to Kintz (1989)
is not really applied and in any event cannot legally be applied to European Union citizens. Kintz also
argue that the system is much less known in the ￿dØpartement￿ of Moselle.
10The amount of RMI given is equal to a minimum revenue of approximately 450 euros minus income.
7Figure 2: Map of France
territory, but instead depends on distance to the border as any gravity model pre-
dicts, it is quite likely that Alsace-Moselle is disproportionately a￿ected by the Ger-
man economic cycle when it di￿ers from the French economic cycle. In such a case,
any comparison of ￿before and after￿ in Alsace-Moselle and the rest of France will be
contaminated by spillover e￿ects. To solve this di￿cult issue, we will need to do sev-
eral additional comparisons with una￿ected groups in both Alsace-Moselle and the rest
of France. These amount to falsi￿cation exercises or triple di￿erences, combining the
di￿erence-in-di￿erences results of the a￿ected and una￿ected.
2.3 Other local transfers
In the early discussion of the law, Claude Evin noted that some places in France had
already implemented a type of social help. He gave the example of two dØpartements (Ile-
et-Vilaine, dept #35, in Britanny, and Territoire de Belfort, dept #90, next to Alsace)
and cities (Besan￿on, in Doubs, dept #25, next to Territoire de Belfort ; Grenoble, in
IsŁre, dept #38, in French Alps). Interestingly enough, neither he nor the Rapporteur
of the project, Belorgey, mentioned Alsace and Moselle social laws, despite the evident
importance of local social laws in the region. Kintz (1989) recalls that ￿local social aid is
one of the less known sector of local laws in Alsace-Moselle and points out some errors
or omissions about the local system in the early discussions at the French Parliament￿.
82.4 A survey of the literature
A comprehensive survey of the RMI and the debate regarding its evolution during its
￿rst decade can be found in L’Horty and Parent (1999). In addition to the papers
already cited in Section 2.1, the existing literature points to the strong disincentive
e￿ects of the RMI. Rioux (2001) ￿nds that RMI recipients search for a job less than the
unemployed not receiving bene￿ts. Using case studies, Gurgand and Margolis (2001)
￿nd that gains from ￿nding a job are low for RMI recipients. In particular, more than
half of single mothers would see their income decrease if they were to take a job. Zoyem
(2001) showed that 40% of RMI recipients never signed a ￿contrat d’insertion sociale
ou professionnelle￿, the contract specifying the path towards insertion. He also showed
that the transition through those contracts for the other 60% only had marginal e￿ects
on job placement: he only found a signi￿cant e￿ect on placement in subsidized jobs
(local public services or local administrations) and insigni￿cant e￿ects on placement
into temporary or permanent private sector jobs.
Terracol (2009), using data on the French part of the European Community House-
hold Panel, managed to calculate the eligibility of recipients and found adverse e￿ects of
eligibility on ￿nding a job in a duration model. Bargain and Doorley (2009), using a re-
gression discontinuity approach based on age ￿ childless adults below 25 are not eligible ￿
also found strong e￿ects on employment, a -7 to -10% employment e￿ect for uneducated
men. Overall, the literature shows disincentive e￿ects, despite partial reforms to reduce
poverty traps (HagnØrØ and Trannoy, 2001) 11.
3 Empirical methodology
Given the literature described above and simple theoretical reasoning, one may be willing
to test whether the RMI has the following e￿ects:
1. A decline in the search e￿ort of job seekers, all the more when available jobs are
part-time.
2. A decrease in employment due to a wage-push e￿ect of the policy.
3. A rise in unemployment due to lower e￿ort and lower job creation.
4. An increase in the number of unemployed coming from inactivity due to ￿labeling
e￿ects￿. That is, non-searching workers claiming RMI bene￿ts and falsely counted as
unemployed.
To investigate these e￿ects, we compare the more than 25 years old to the less than
25 years old (not a￿ected by the RMI), in the rest of France compared to Alsace-Moselle,
11In 1998 and 2001, the transitory period during which a cumul of labor earnings and social minima
was allowed (initially 3 months) was extended. After 2000, the amount of the housing allowance was
calculated without taking into account a part of the labor earnings below the RMI. Finally, the ￿Prime
pour l’Emploi￿ (a moderate wage subsidy enacted through the tax system, with a negative income tax
component) was introduced in 2001.
9before and after 1989. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the di￿erence in unemployment
rates between the more than 25 years old, and less than 25 years old.
The rest of France and Alsace-Moselle are on similar trends before 1989. However,
starting in 1989, unemployment rates of the more than 25 years old increases more in
the rest of France than in Alsace Moselle. Results are similar for employment rates in
Figure 4.
The rest of France and Alsace Moselle are on similar trends prior to 1989. However,
after 1989, employment rates for the 25 years old in Alsace Moselle are on average closer
to those in the rest of France, pointing to negative e￿ects of the RMI on employment.
To investigate the statistical signi￿cance of these results, we turn to regression analy-
sis, and consider many variables: the transitions between labor market states, job search
activity, wages and ￿nally the evolution of employment rates, unemployment rates and
non-participation. We compare the rest of France after 1989, relative to the rest of
France before 1989, compared to the similar evolution in Alsace Moselle.
First, we focus on transitions from unemployment and out of the labor force (U and
N) in year t   1 to employment in year t, for individuals who would be eligible to the
RMI in year t, based on their status in year t   1. More speci￿cally, there are two
conditions to determine eligibility to the RMI. The ￿rst condition stipulates that the
individual must be more than 25 years old. The second condition states that quarterly
total household income12 must be inferior to a certain level 13.
To obtain information on a certain individual the year before, we use the longitudinal
nature of France’s Labor Force Survey, the EnquŒte Emploi. This survey is collected
every year in March. The random and representative sample is partly renewed every
year: only a third of the households in the sample are surveyed again the next year,
and overall each household is interviewed three times. In this paper, we keep all the
individuals for which we have information the year before. This represents 1,539,167
such individuals between 1982 and 2002 (see Appendix Table 1 for descriptive statistics
of this sample). Given our identi￿cation strategy, which is based on three ￿dØpartements￿
representing a relatively small fraction of France, the Labor Force Survey represents the
best possible data, because its size allows for a large enough control group.
We then focus on eligible, i.e. low income, households. In France, the duration of
unemployment bene￿ts was calculated on the basis of tenure in the previous job. In
12Total income includes income from all possible sources (wage, bonus, in-kind payments, unem-
ployment insurance, "allocations familiales", "allocations logement", pro￿t from ￿rms or agricultural
exploitation, pensions, real estate revenues, alimonies, unemployment insurance).
13The maximum RMI amount in 1989 is 2000FF/month for a single individual. It is re-evaluated by
decree every year. We collected these decrees for every year after 1989. However, there was no RMI
before 1989. To determine the maximum RMI amount that could have been obtained before 1988 (and
thus a theoretical eligibility had the RMI been instituted), we de￿ate the 1988 maximum RMI amount
by the Consumer Price Index. Indeed, L’Horty et al (1999) discuss the indexation of the RMI based on
the consumer price index in France.
10Figure 3: Unemployment rate di￿erences between the 25 years old and the less than 25
years old, in the the Rest of France (ROF, in dark blue) and Alsace Moselle (AM, in
light red)
11Figure 4: Employment rate di￿erences between the 25 years old and the less than 25
years old, in the the Rest of France (ROF, in dark blue) and Alsace Moselle (AM, in
light red)
12particular, in 1989, individuals are granted a proportion of their past income during 3,
15, or 30 months, if they have worked respectively 4, 8, or more than 12 months in their
past job (Daniel, 1999). One can thus safely assume that an individual more than 24
years old, AND in a low-income household, AND who has been unemployed for more
than 20 months the year before or is out of the labor force, is eligible for the RMI
a year after, i.e. 12 months later, if he remains unemployed, as his unemployment
insurance runs out.
The drawback of this strategy is that we only observe income in the previous year,
and not in the previous quarter. Hence, the eligibility is subject to measurement error.
An implication of this is that the e￿ects we will estimate in the regression analysis are
likely to be underestimating the true coe￿cients. We will therefore need to interpret
our results as a possible lower bound of our estimates 14.
In this sample, we ￿nd 44,663 individuals of more than 24 years old, AND in a low-
income household, AND who have been unemployed for more than 20 months or out of
the labor force the year before. Note that these individuals are eligible to the RMI
in year t only if t  1989 in the rest of France, as the RMI was enacted in 1989. In
contrast, such individuals are eligible to the RMI for all years t in Alsace-Moselle, as the
RMI is available in Alsace Moselle before (under the form of the ￿aide sociale￿) and after
1989. In this paper, we compare the transitions back to employment of these eligible
individuals before and after 1989, in the rest of France compared to Alsace-Moselle.
The disincentive e￿ects of the RMI, if they exist, imply that individuals are less likely
to get a job if they can bene￿t from the RMI. Thus, we should see fewer transitions back
to employment for eligible individuals in the rest of France after 1989, relative to the rest
of France before 1989. We should observe no di￿erences in Alsace Moselle in the extent
of these transitions before and after 1989, as the RMI is available to eligible individuals
before and after. Thus, Alsace Moselle is an ideal control group for the rest of France.
This forms the basis of a di￿erence-in-di￿erences analysis. Formally, we will perform
regressions of the following form:
employmentijt = j + t + 1(Rest_of_France)  (After1989)ijt + Xijt + uit (1)
where i corresponds to individual i, j to department j and t to year t. The dependent
variable employmentijt is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the individual is working
at time t, 0 otherwise. It may be interpreted as a transition from unemployment or
inactivity (U and N) to employment, as we focus on individuals unemployed or out of
the labor force at time t   1. j are department ￿xed e￿ects (95), and t are year ￿xed
14In this sense, we follow the earlier papers such as Piketty (1998) who used the Labor Force Survey.
We have less precise data than in Terracol (2009) who uses the French data of the European Community
Panel with detailed information of monthly income. However, this panel only starts in 1994 and is not
appropriate for our identi￿cation strategy, beyond the too limited sample size in Alsace-Moselle.
13e￿ects (20). (Rest_of_France)  (After1989)ijt is an interaction term between the
two following dichotomous variables. Rest_of_Francej is a dichotomous variable that
takes the value 1 if individual i resides in the rest of France, 0 otherwise. After1989t
is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if individual i is interviewed after
1989, 0 otherwise. The coe￿cient of interest is 1, which measures the relative increase
in transitions to employment for individuals in the rest of France after the reform.
Additionally, 22 control variables (5 age dummies, sex, household size and 15 diploma
dummies) are included in the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the level of
the department to account for serial correlation within department, the unit at which
the reform is implemented (Moulton, 1990), that may arise in a di￿erence-in-di￿erences
estimation (Bertrand et al, 2004).
4 Results
4.1 Preliminary investigation: double-di￿erence results
Table 1 looks at the impact of the RMI on transitions, search e￿ort, stocks, and wages,
based on double di￿erence. The next sub-section provides additional causal evidence
based on triple di￿erences. In column (1), the sample is restricted to individuals more
than 24 years old, AND in a low-income household, AND who have been unemployed
for more than 20 months, or out of the labor force, in year t 1; in other words eligible
to the RMI in year t. The coe￿cient 1 of the variable ￿Rest of France*After year 1989￿
re￿ects the e￿ect of the RMI on the hazard rate into employment. This coe￿cient is
large and negative: it is equal to -0.04, meaning that the probability of ￿nding a job
is 4 percentage points lower for an eligible individual in the rest of France after 1989,
relative to a similar eligible individual in the rest of France before 1989, compared to
the same evolution for eligible individuals in Alsace-Moselle before and after 1989. This
result is statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. This is suggestive of disincentive
e￿ects: individuals with access to the RMI are less likely to get back to work. This 4
percentage point decrease is a sizeable e￿ect, considering that only 10 percent of such
individuals get a job.
In column (2), the coe￿cient is also large and signi￿cantly negative on transitions
from U to E. This could be due in part to a composition e￿ect of the pool of the
unemployed itself, which we term the ￿labeling e￿ect￿: individuals not searching, that
is, theoretically out of the labor force, may have had an incentive to falsely declare
themselves unemployed, either because they felt this would help obtain the RMI or
because of a feeling of guilt with respect to the interviewers.
To investigate, at least in part, the existence of this phenomenon, we may look at
transitions from N to U. In column (3), the sample is restricted to out of the labor force
individuals, more than 24 years old, in a low-income household in year t   1; in other
14words eligible to the RMI in year t. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable,
equal to ￿1￿ if the individual is unemployed, ￿0￿ otherwise. The coe￿cient is positive but
not signi￿cant, which points to a weak ￿labeling e￿ect￿. This change in the composition
of the pool of the unemployed due to false declaration about job search activity and
false labeling of Labor Force Statistics may therefore not be the main reason behind the
lower hazard rate.
Column (4) looks at search e￿ort of the unemployed workers. The dependent variable
in column (4) is the change, from one year to the next, in a dichotomous variable, equal
to ￿1￿ if the individual has placed an ad, or responded to an ad in a newspaper or on
a notice-board15. The sample in column (4) is the long-term (more than 20 months)
unemployed in a low income household a year before. Search e￿ort decreases, but not
signi￿cantly so.
Columns (5) and (6) look at the stocks of employed and unemployed. The sample
is restricted to the unskilled workers (high school dropouts). In column (5), the depen-
dent variable is a dichotomous variable, equal to ￿1￿ if the individual is employed, ￿0￿
otherwise. The probability of being employed decreases by 4 percentage points. This
indicates strong disincentive e￿ects on unskilled workers. Column (6) indicates that
unemployment rises. Column (7) looks at wages, and ￿nds no signi￿cant impact on
wages.
Table 1 has presented evidence that the RMI is associated with quite strong disincen-
tive e￿ects. The results are based on simple di￿erence-in-di￿erences analysis between the
rest of France and Alsace-Moselle, before and after 1989. The main assumption on which
this analysis relies is the ￿common time e￿ects￿ assumption: to interpret causally the
di￿erence-in-di￿erences coe￿cient, one needs to assume that the treatment and control
group are on the same time trend. In other words, the rest of France would have evolved
the same way Alsace-Moselle did had the RMI not been implemented. This is certainly
a strong assumption considering some inherent characteristics of Alsace Moselle, for ex-
ample, its close proximity to Germany, which may have experienced an economic upturn
over the same period.
15There are generally two ways to search for a job. First, an individual may place an ad, or respond
to an ad, in a newspaper or on a notice-board of the governmental organizations (ANPE). This option
is chosen by 32 percent of the individuals looking for a job in France. Second, an individual may pursue
a more proactive approach, by registering in a temporary work agency, contacting directly employers,
or looking for a job through personal relationships. 99 percent of the individuals follow (or at least
self-report that they follow) this option. Considering the low variability in the second option, we prefer
to focus on the ￿rst option, i.e. placing or responding to an ad in a newspaper or on a notice-board.
We ￿nd no e￿ect of the RMI on the more proactive ways to search for a job.
154.2 Benchmark estimates: triple di￿erences
We address this concern by performing triple di￿erences. We use the individuals less
than 25 years old, as a category knowingly not a￿ected by the RMI. The RMI only
applies to individuals above 25 years 16, whereas ￿aide sociale￿ in Alsace Moselle applies
to individuals of more than 16 years old. This means that individuals less than 24 years
old a year before are not a￿ected by the RMI in France, and are a￿ected by the ￿aide
sociale￿ in Alsace Moselle, before and after 1989. Using the less than 25 years old in
a triple di￿erences analysis is a strong test of the ￿common time e￿ects￿ assumption.
The ￿common time e￿ects￿ assumption is replaced by a new, less demanding, one: that
individuals below or above 25 years old are subject to the same relative trend in Alsace-
Moselle with respect to the rest of France.
The sample in Table 2 includes individuals aged above and below 25 years old.
We de￿ne ￿More than 25￿ as a dichotomous variable equal to ￿1￿ if the individuals
is more than 25 years old, ￿0￿ otherwise. We then interact this dichotomous variable
with all variables contained in the di￿erence-in-di￿erences analysis of equation (2), i.e.
(Rest_of_France)(After1989)ijt, the department and year ￿xed e￿ects. The coe￿-
cient of interest is now in front of (Rest_of_France)(After1989)(More_than_25)ijt,
a triple di￿erences coe￿cient.
Column (1) shows that the probability to ￿nd a job is 7 percentage points lower
after the RMI was implemented in France. This is in contrast to the individuals less
than 25 years old, who did not experience such a decrease. Columns (2) to (7) replicate
the analysis performed in Table 1, but in a triple di￿erences framework. Consistent
with Table 1, Table 2 shows a negative impact on transitions from U to E (column (2)),
no impact on transitions from N to U (the ￿labeling e￿ect￿ in column (3)), a decrease
in search e￿ort (column (4)). The probability to be employed decreases (column (5)),
while the probability to be unemployed increases (column (6)). No such e￿ect is found
on wages as indicated in column (7).
These e￿ects are large in magnitude. For example, column (1) indicates a seven
percentage point decrease in the probability of transitioning to employment from un-
employment or from being out of the labor force. Appendix Table 1 shows that such
individuals represent 5 percent of the unskilled population between 25 and 55 years old,
or approximately 15 million people. 17 The RMI thus caused 52,50018 people to remain
unemployed or out of the labor force because of disincentive e￿ects. Column (6) shows
a 3 percentage point reduction in total employment. Considering that 73 percent of the
16It also applies to individuals below 25 but with dependent children and an income level below the
threshold. This very rarely happens in the data.
17Source: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATnon02150 RØpartition
de la population par sexe et ￿ge au 1er janvier 2011. Insee, estimations de population (rØsultats
provisoires arrŒtØs ￿n 2010).
187%*5%*15 millions.
16total population is employed, this represents 328, 500 individuals 19.
4.3 Heterogeneous e￿ects
Table 3 looks at the impact of the RMI more speci￿cally on part-time workers and on
di￿erent household compositions.
Column (1) shows the full sample result (as in of column (1) of Table 2). Column
(2) instead restricts the analysis to part-time workers. The dependent variable is a
dichotomous variable, equal to ￿1￿ if the individual is employed part-time, ￿0￿ otherwise.
The RMI has an e￿ect on part-time work but not full-time work, as seen in column (3).
This is expected since the disincentive e￿ects are stronger for part-time work than for
full-time work.
Column (4) to (7) restrict the sample to di￿erent household compositions (single
persons, single parents, couples without children, couples with children). Column (5)
indicates that the e￿ect of the RMI is mostly felt by single parents, a fact consistent
with the existing literature (e.g. Piketty 1998, Gurgand and Margolis 2001).
4.4 Other checks: robustness and falsi￿cation
The methodology is simple and transparent and can therefore be extended along several
dimensions. For the sake of concision, we will place several additional tables in the
Appendix (Appendix Tables 2 to 4) and only brie￿y describe the results. First, we
vary the duration of the unemployment spell to show that the results are not sensitive
to the particular measure of eligibility used, or the focus on individuals having been
unemployed for more than 18 and 22 months the year before. The results remain very
similar (see results in Appendix Table 2). We also removed the 22 control variables
(5 age dummies, sex, household size and 15 diploma dummies), with no change in the
results: the results are not particularly sensitive to the particular set of control variables
used.
A concern with this estimation is the long time frame used. We use the EnquŒte
Emploi from 1982 to 2002. This long time span is advantageous because it gives a
large sample size, but the drawback is the possibility that many other things could have
happened in the rest of France compared to Alsace Moselle over this period. We thus
restricted the sample from 1985 to 1995. Results are robust to this restricted sample.
We then perform a falsi￿cation exercise by looking at a period slightly before the
enactment of the RMI, in column (6) of Appendix Table 2. For instance, we focus on the
period 1984-1985, and look at the interaction term (Rest_of_France)(After1985)ijt.
There was no RMI in France before or after 1985, while there was the ￿aide sociale￿ in
193%*73*15 millions.
17Alsace-Moselle over the same period. Thus, we should see no signi￿cant di￿erence-in-
di￿erences coe￿cient, as there has been no change in the rest of France over the period.
Indeed, the di￿erence-in-di￿erences coe￿cient of this regression are not signi￿cantly
di￿erent from zero. This indicates that the individuals considered, i.e. more than 24
years old, AND in a low-income household, AND with no household members earning
unemployment insurance, AND who have been unemployed for more than 20 months,
or are out of the labor force, in year t 1, evolve in a same manner in the rest of France
or in Alsace-Moselle, in a period preceeding the enactment of the RMI.
We also remove in column (7) the dØpartements of Ile-et-Vilaine (35), Doubs (25),
Territoire de Belfort (90), and Isere (38) from the sample as some sort of ￿aide sociale￿
already existed in some of their municipalities, as explained in Section 2.3; and results
do not change.
We ￿nally present another triple di￿erences analysis. Focusing on individuals that
are more than 24 years old, AND unemployed for more than 20 months or out of the
labor force, in year t 1, but who live in a household whose members earn more than the
maximum RMI amount, we obtain a group of individuals similar in many dimensions
to the eligible individuals, but they are ineligible to the RMI in year t. In column
(8) of Appendix Table 2, we ￿nd no impact on the transitions back to employment
of these individuals, before and after 1989, in the rest of France compared to Alsace-
Moselle. Column (9) performs a triple di￿erence analysis using these two categories of
individuals. We de￿ne ￿Long term-low income a year before￿, as a dichotomous variable
equal to ￿1￿ if the individuals is more than 24 years old, AND in a low-income household,
AND with no household members earning unemployment insurance, AND who has been
unemployed for more than 20 months or out of the labor force, in year t   1, ￿0￿ if the
individual is more than 24 years old, AND in a high-income household, AND who has
been unemployed for more than 20 months, or out of the labor force, in year t   1.
We interact this dichotomous variable with all variables contained in the di￿erence-in-
di￿erences analysis, i.e. (Rest_of_France)  (After1989)ijt, the department and year
￿xed e￿ects. Column (9) shows that eligible individuals experience a 3 percentage point
decline in their probability ofreturning to work due to the RMI.
4.5 Regression discontinuity design
Following Lemieux et al. (2008) in response to Fortin et al. (2004), we also perform a
regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of the RMI on employment. After
1989, in the rest of France, only individuals more than 25 years old were eligible to the
minimum income. We use this sharp discontinuity to compare the employment probabil-
ities of individuals just above 25 years old compared to thosejust below 25 years old. As
opposed to the di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimator, we do not need to make assumptions
about the comparability of the treated group to a control group that is temporally or
geographically distinct (Lemieux et al., 2008). A regression discontinuity design controls
18for the changing macroeconomic environment. Conditional on the assumption that in-
dividuals do not manipulate their age to bene￿t from the minimum income, being more
or less than 25 years old at the time of the survey is essentially random (Lee, 2008).
Following Lemieux et al. (2008), we focus our analysis on high school dropouts 20. We
perform regressions of the following form:
employmentijt = j + t + 1(More_than_25)ijt + (age) + Xijt + uit (2)
where the dependent variable employmentijt is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the
individual is working at time t, 0 otherwise. The variable of interest is ￿More than 25￿, a
dichotomous variable equal to ￿1￿ if the individual is more than 25 year old, ￿0￿ otherwise.
We also include a continuous function of age (age) in the regression to capture the
impact of age on employment. The intuition of the regression discontinuity design is
that there is no reason to expect an abrupt change in employment probabilities at 25
years old, other than through the eligibility to the minimum income. The identi￿cation
assumption is violated if people can ￿cheat￿ on their age. This problem is unlikely to
occur since the true age can be easily veri￿ed by the authorities (Lemieux et al., 2008).
Results are reported in Appendix Table 3. In columns (1) to (3), the sample is
restricted to individuals in the rest of France, after 1989, and in a 5-year window around
the age of 25 years old (between 19 and 30 years old). Column (1) includes a cubic
speci￿cation for age. An individual who just turns 25 experiences a 3 percentage points
decrease in its probability to be working. This result is statistically signi￿cant at the 1
percent level.
Columns (2) and (3) show that the coe￿cient is the same when controlling for dØ-
partement ￿xed e￿ects, and year ￿xed e￿ects (column (2)), and for the sex of the in-
dividual, the household size, and education dummies (column (3)). Column (4) shows
that the result is not sensitive to the choice of the 5 year window by expanding the
window to 7 years around the age of 25 years. Column (5) is based on a local linear
regression with the discontinuity based on age, and reports estimates of a signi￿cantly
negative coe￿cient21.
Falsi￿cation exercises are presented in columns (6) to (8). Column (6) restricts the
sample to high school dropouts, in the rest of France, before 1989, and in a 5-year window
around the age of 25 years old (between 19 and 30 years old). There was no minimum
income in the rest of France before 1989. Thus there should be no systematic di￿erence
between individuals just above or just below 25 years old. This is indeed what is found
in column (6). Columns (7) to (8) performs the same analysis in Alsace-Moselle. The
￿aide sociale￿ in Alsace-Moselle operates a di￿erent cut-o￿ rule: individuals have to be
2085 percent of the bene￿ciaries of the minimum income are high-school dropouts.
21A bootstrap method was used to estimate the statistical signi￿cance of the estimate. 1,000 obser-
vations were selected at random, and used to estimate the RDD coe￿cient with local linear regressions.
This was repeated 100 times. The coe￿cient is deemed signi￿cantly negative at x% if it is positive less
than x% of the times.
19aged more than 16 years old to be eligible to ￿aide sociale￿. Thus there should be no
systematic di￿erences in Alsace-Moselle between individuals just above or just below 25
years old, before or after 1989. This is indeed what is found in column (7) (after 1989),
and in column (8) (Before 1989).
These regression discontinuity design estimates are similar to the di￿erence-in-di￿erences
estimate found in previous sections. This reinforces the con￿dence one might have in
these results.
4.6 Alternative explanations
The negative e￿ect on employment could be due to the fact that the RMI would allow
bene￿ciaries to be more demanding about the quality of the job they are looking for.
It would thus take them longer to ￿nd such a job. If it is the case, then a negative
employment e￿ect in the short run might be balanced by a positive e￿ect in the long
run. We test this mechanism by looking at two measures of job requirements by job
searchers.
The dependent variable in column (1) of Appendix Table 4 is a dichotomous variable,
equal to "1" if the individual is looking for a permanent job, "0" if the individual is
looking for a temporary job. No e￿ect of the RMI is found on these di￿erent kinds of
jobs, indicating that the mechanism cited above is not at play. The dependent variable
in column (2) is a dichotomous variable, equal to "1" if the individual is demanding in his
search, "0" otherwise. Being demanding is de￿ned from a question on the nature of the
job searched. Respondents indicate if they are searching for a full-time job exclusively
(not part-time), a part-time job exclusively (not full-time), a full-time job but would
accept a part-time job, a part-time job but would accept a full-time job. The ￿rst two
answers correspond to a demanding job seeker, while the last two answers correspond
to a more ￿exible job seeker. We found no impact of the RMI on the last two questions,
therefore no impact on the proportion of ￿exible job seekers.
Finally, partial reforms were implemented between 1998 and 2001 22. To quantify their
impact, one may reproduce the Regression Discontinuity Design analysis performed in
Appendix Table 3 to a period before and after 2000. Column (3) restricts the sample to
individuals in the rest of France, after 1989, and before 2000, and in a 5-year window
around the age of 25 years old (between 19 and 30 years old), while column (4) restricts
the sample to individuals in the rest of France, after 2000. The RDD analysis ￿nds no
signi￿cant di￿erence in the coe￿cients before and after 2000, pointing to the relative
ine￿cacy of these partial reforms.
22As described in Section 2, the transitory period for a possible cumul of labor earnings and social
minima was extended in 1998 and 2001. In 2000, the housing allowance was made partly unconditional
to the RMI. An employment subsidy (Prime pour l’Emploi) was enacted in 2001.
205 Model
In this section, we build a search and matching model based on a simpli￿ed version of
Garibaldi and Wasmer (2004) 23, which will be calibrated using the previous di￿erence-
in-di￿erences results and then used to analyse counterfactual policies. We apply it to
the segment of the labor force where individuals have low skills and earn the minimum
wage.
5.1 Setup
Time is continuous, individuals and ￿rms are risk-neutral and discount the future at
rate r. Individuals consume their income and face some utility costs from working or
searching for a job. Employed workers work h hours at the monthly minimum wage w;
where h is not a choice variable for individuals but instead a parameter. This parameter
is expressed as a fraction of a full-time job (39 hours per week at the time). The amount
of RMI transfer to an individual working h hours is denoted by rmi(h). The maximum
amount of the transfer is for individuals who are not working: rmi(0) = w where  is
the ratio of the value of the RMI to the minimum wage w, approximately equal to 0.45.
Job search e￿ort is denoted by e and job search e￿ort of ￿inactive￿ workers is assumed
to be zero. We assume that the cost of search e￿ort is  (e), and is an increasing and
convex function of e￿ort. Similarly and to save notations, the disutility of working h
hours is denoted by  (h). The RMI recipients are supposed to be unemployed and
actively searching, but are not eligible for unemployment insurance 24.
Hence the ￿ow utility of individuals in the three respective states E (employment),
U (unemployment, ineligible for unemployment insurance, e.g. long-term unemployed
and only covered by RMI) and N (not in the labor force) is as follows:
E: ve = hw + rmi(h)    (h)
U: vu = rmi(0)    (e)
N: vn = rmi(0)
23In the 2004 paper, the authors introduced participation decisions at the extensive margin in a
search-matching model ￿ la Pissarides (2000). In the current work, we use the benchmark structure of
the model and introduce continuous job search e￿ort.
24In Section 4.3 of Garibaldi and Wasmer, there is a distinction between covered and uncovered job
seekers, and denoted by Uc and Uu the two categories. That model implied that job seekers may
be uncovered if they came out of inactivity, but would be covered by the unemployment insurance
if they came out of employment. That part of the model was therefore a 4-state model of the labor
force. In our current work, we make a simplifying assumption: the employment spells of the RMI-eligible
population are too short (temporary work) or represent to few hours (part-time jobs) to imply eligibility
to unemployment insurance after job loss. Doing so, our model remains a three state model of the labor
market and can be analyzed more simply.
21We will assume that the introduction of the RMI acts as an increase in  from 0
to 0.45 leading to a rise in u by w. We also start the analysis in assuming ￿rst that
wages of the target RMI population would be close enough to the minimum wage to be
considered as exogenous as well (the next sub-section will relax this assumption). Recall
that the amount transferred by RMI led to a 100% marginal tax rate of hours worked.
For all hours worked between 0 and 40% of a full-time job, the income hw + rmi(h)
would therefore be constant with h. Only after 40% would the additional hour worked
yield some additional income to individuals. Therefore, for a worker with positive hours,
e will also rise but by less than w as compared to the situation without RMI.
5.1.1 Optimal job search e￿ort
The Bellman equations of the model are as follows:
rE = hw + rmi(h)    (h) + s(U   E) + sN(N   E)
rU = rmi(0)    (e) + (p  e)(E   U)
rN = rmi(0) + (U   N)
where p is a parameter re￿ecting the aggregate state of the labor market and made
endogenous later on, e is job search e￿ort of the individual, s is the exogenous rate at
which workers switch from employment to unemployment, sN is the exogenous rate at
which workers switch from employment to inactivity, and  is the exogenous rate at
which workers switch from inactivity to active job search. All ￿ow parameters ( s;sN, 
and p) are continuous time Poisson parameters.
Optimal job search e￿ort is given by a ￿rst order condition:
dU
de
= 0 ,
 
0(e) = p(E   U) (3)
stating that the marginal cost of e￿ort  0(e) equals at the optimal choice the marginal
return on e￿ort, that is a marginal gain in probability p to get a job times the capital
gain E   U from getting the job.
Straightforward calculations lead to the value of E   U as a function of parameters
(see Appendix for an exact calculation). We can then derive the value of optimal e￿ort
as a function of parameters as in the next Figure.
5.1.2 Demand side
The ￿rm side is classical. Firms observe the optimal search e￿ort of workers and create
vacancies so as to exhaust pro￿t opportunities. Denote by c the cost of posting a vacancy
22and q the rate at which ￿rms recruit workers, and ￿nally y the hourly productivity. We
have :
rV =  c + q(J   V )
rJ = yh   wh + (s + sN)(V   J)
where V is the value of a job vacancy and J is the value of a ￿lled job. Free-entry implies
that
V = 0
=) J = c=q =
yh   wh
r + s + sN
5.1.3 Equilibrium
Finally, both p and q are made consistent through the existence of an aggregate matching
function M(eNU;NV) where NU is the number of unemployed, e is the average job
search e￿ort in the population of the unemployed, and NV is the number of posted
vacancies. We assume a constant return to scale function. Hence we have, introducing
23 =
NV
eNU, the following transition rates:
p =
M(eNU;NV)
eNU
= M(1;) = p()
q =
M(eNU;NV)
NV
= M(1=;1) = q()
with p
0() > 0 and q
0() < 0.
This delivers the equilibrium value of , since there is a unique  function of the
parameters y;w;c;r;s and sN such that
c
q()
=
yh   wh
r + s + sN
Plugging into the optimal search e￿ort condition determined by equation (3), we
obtain the optimal search e￿ort e(;p()). The equilibrium of the labor market is
therefore described by the couple (, e).
Proposition 1 Labor market tightness does not depend on , the level of RMI as com-
pared to the minimum wage. The RMI has an impact only through a reduction in job
search e￿ort e, with @e
@ < 0.
Firms react to RMI through the search e￿ort: the value of  is independent of ,
but the total number of vacancies is equal to NV = e   and thus reacts to the RMI.
In a symmetric equilibrium where every unemployed individual searches the same
amount, we have the following stock-￿ow conditions :
dNU
dt
= 0 = NN + s(1   NN   NU)   e
p(
)NU
dNN
dt
= 0 =  NN + sN(1   NN   NU)
where 1   NN   NU is the total number of jobs created by ￿rms. The last equation
implies that
NU = 1   NN(1 +

sN
)
24while the ￿rst one implies
NN(1 +
s
sN
) = e
p(
)NU
Combining the two, we have
NU =
1
1 +
ep()

sN+
sN+s
The number of unemployed workers decreases with  and with job search e￿ort and
increases with s.
Proposition 2 Denote by e
0 the value of job search e￿ort when  = 0 (no RMI),
and by e() the post-RMI value as calculated above. The causal impact of RMI on
unemployment is given by
 =
1
1 +
e()p()

sN+
sN+s
 
1
1 +
e
0p()

sN+
sN+s
Corollary 3 The rate of unemployment is
u = NU=(1   NN) =
1
1 +
e()p
s+sN
which increases with the out￿ows from employment ( s and sN), decreases with job search
e￿ort eand with the rate of job creation by ￿rms p().
5.2 Extensions
5.2.1 Endogenous wage
Let us now assume that wages are not ￿xed but partly re￿ect the workers’ outside
options. To simplify, we assume a static bargaining rule, such that
wh = yh + (1   )w
R
where wR is the monthly wage that equalizes the utility U and E, namely
w
R = rmi(0)   rmi(h) +  (h)    (e)
Given that rmi(0)   rmi(h) is greater than 0 for all hours worked, the introduction of
the RMI must raise wages in the economy for all eligible workers except when  is equal
to one.
255.2.2 Job search
A second extension is to allow individuals to direct their search towards either part-
time or full-time jobs. Indeed, many of the RMI recipients were not able to immediately
obtain a full time job and had to accept, at least for some time, part-time jobs where the
disincentive e￿ects of RMI were likely to be large. Therefore, we may want to modify
the model to allow for this possibility. Relaxing ￿rst the labor demand side, we can
decompose the search e￿ort into two components, e = eF + eP where the subscript F,
P re￿ect the e￿ort spent into full-time or part-time. Similarly let pF and pP be the job
￿nding rate of part-time and full-time jobs. Finally, let E(P) and E(F) be the value of
part-time and full time employment. We have
rU = rmi(0)    (eF + eP) + (pF  eF)(EF   U) + (pP  eP)(EP   U):
The ￿rst order condition for e￿ort appears to be similar to that of the undirected
search version of the model. Optimal job search e￿ort is given by a ￿rst order condition:
dU
deK
= 0;K = F;P ,
 
0(eF + eP) = pF(EF   U) = pP(EP   U) (4)
stating that the marginal cost of e￿ort  0(e) at the optimal choice is equal to the marginal
return on e￿ort, which is the marginal gain in probability pKof getting a job of type
K = F;P times the capital gain EK   U from getting the job.
On the employer side, the free-entry condition still holds but we need to rede￿ne the
concept of job market tightness: let K =
NV;K
eKNU be the tightness for the market of jobs
of type K=F,P. We now have:
pK =
M(eKNU;NV;K)
eKNU
= M(1;K) = p(K)
qK =
M(eKNU;NV;K)
NV;K
= M(1=K;1) = q(K)
and ￿nally, the free-entry condition writes :
c
q(
K)
=
yhK   whK
r + s + sN
where subscripts K = F;P apply to the number of job vacancies NV;K, hours hK and
recruiting rate qK.
266 Calibration and decomposition of the e￿ects
The model is now used, in its benchmark version, to calibrate the French economy prior
to the RMI reform. One key parameter of interest is the elasticity of e￿ort in the cost
function, since this elasticity determines the magnitude of disincentive e￿ects and has
further consequences on the elasticity of employment and labor supply to wages.
Our strategy is as follows: we will estimate the coe￿cients of the model to ￿t several
targets, including the average level of unemployment and of labor market participation
prior to the reform, and the di￿erence-in-di￿erence estimate of the economy post-RMI,
which identi￿es the causal e￿ect. With this methodology, we obtain the value of the
disutility of additional e￿ort. Finally, using the full-parametrized model, we are able to
run a number of counterfactual experiments. In particular, we examine what employ-
ment e￿ects would have been obtained in 1989 if the 2007 RSA reform (which increased
the incentives to work when compared with the RMI alone) had been implemented right
away, in place of the RMI.
The calibration speci￿cally targets a group of unskilled workers over the period 1982-
1988, chosen among those most likely to be paid around the minimum wage level and
to potentially be eligible for the RMI. The target group is chosen among the 25-55 year
old population, so as to remove transitions between higher education and activity or
between activity and retirement. We also select those having an education level below
"BaccalaurØat", that is the equivalent of high school dropouts. Summary statistics of
this population group are displayed in Appendix Table 1.
We see that 81 percent of them are either employed or unemployed. Those with a
job have on average a wage equal to 124% of the minimum wage 25. The fraction of the
unemployed population amounts to 10 percent of the labor force. The six transitions
between the three di￿erent labor market states E, U and N are displayed in the bottom of
the table. The high school dropouts represent 63% of the 25-55 year old. The statistics
are reported in Table Appendix 1.
6.1 Preliminary : extending to more ￿ows
Before doing so, we ￿rst extend the model, in order to account for all observed transitions
between labor market states. In particular, we let workers ￿ow between unemployment
and inactivity, thus adding one more transition rate to the previous model. This leads
to a new asset value for unemployment, as follows :
rU = w    (e) + (p  e)(E   U) + un(N   U)
25For each individual, we calculated the hourly wage. It was then compared to the minimum wage
(SMIC) in that year. The average of this ratio is 1.24.
27and the following modi￿ed stock-￿ow equations:
dNU
dt
= 0 = NN + s(1   NN   NU)   (e
p(
) + un)NU
dNN
dt
= 0 =  NN + sN(1   NN   NU) + unNU
Second, and following Garibaldi and Wasmer’s (2005) calibration of US labor market
dynamics, we argue that the direct ￿ows between inactivity and employment are mis-
measurement, due to the inability of yearly surveys to properly identify infra-yearly
transitions. Someone observed in time t   1 in state N and in time t in state E must
have actually transited through "active search" before getting a job. Therefore, if we
denote by
ij, i;j = E;U;N
the 6 quarterly empirical transition rates between the three labor market states, we can
identi￿ed the ￿ve transition rates of the model as, respectively:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
s = EU
sN = EN
un = UN
 = NU + NE
p()e = UE + NE
(5)
We also compute transition rates between the six states. Since these ￿ow rates are
on a yearly basis and may re￿ect partly infra-yearly transition, we build a transition
matrix AY as :
A
Y =
0
@
1   Y
eu   Y
en Y
eu Y
en
Y
ue 1   Y
ue   Y
un Y
un
Y
ne Y
nu 1   Y
ue   Y
un
1
A
and the quarterly transition matrix AQ is obtained as the unique real 4th root of AY so
that
A
Y =
 
A
Q4
We obtain the following values for the estimated quarterly matrix:
A
Q =
0
@
1   Q
eu   Q
en Q
eu Q
en
Q
ue 1   Q
ue   Q
un Q
un
Q
ne Q
nu 1   Q
ue   Q
un
1
A =
0
@
0:9865 0:0091 0:0044
0:0922 0:8745 0:0333
0:0192 0:0084 0:9724
1
A
We assume that all ￿ows between inactivity and employment transit though a minimum
period of unemployment, and therefore, compute nu as Q
ne + Q
nu = 0:0192 + 0:0084 =
0:0333 and pe as Q
ne +Q
ue = 0:0192+0:0922 = 0:1114. With the calculated ￿ow values
without direct ￿ows between inactivity and employment, the ergodic rate of unemploy-
ment is equal to 10.82 percent of the labor force.
286.2 Calibration methodology and parameters
We will proceed as follows: the hourly productivity y is equal to 1 and the hourly
wage is equal to 0.66 of the hourly productivity in the exogenous wage calibration; the
quarterly interest rate is 1%; as a normalization, the search cost parameter is equal to
labor productivity, and labor market tightness will adjust freely; the e￿ort function is
assumed to be iso-elastic with parameters  (e) = A e ; the parameter A  is set to
unity; the matching function is assumed to be AMN0:5
U V 0:5; the value of the RMI for
a non-employed worker is 0.45 times the full-time wage; the value of the RMI for a
worker employed h hours is max(0:45  w   h  w;0), which re￿ects the poverty trap
mentioned above. Hours are set to the average working hours in the sample,31.5 hours
(h=31.5/39=0.8077 of full-time.)
The di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimates of previous section (Table 2, columns 1) indi-
cates a decrease in the job ￿nding rate by 7 percentage points a year (divide by 4 for the
quarterly values) due to the causal e￿ect of the RMI. We then let the code search for the
values of parameters AM,   such that the model matches the value of unemployment
before the reform(10.3 in the absence of the RMI); a -10/4 quarterly decrease in the job
￿nding rate after the implementation of the RMI. 26
6.3 Calibration results
We ￿nd the following values of the parameters and endogenous variables, as reported
in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) report the results obtained from the same program,
which jointly determines the parameter values and endogenous variables before and after
the introduction of the RMI. Column (3) reports the results of another program, the
RSA program. The RSA program is a 2007 reform of the RMI which keeps the base
component: RSA at zero hours was equal to the value of the RMI at zero hours. But
the RSA at a positive number hours provided additional income for hours worked such
that the marginal tax rate for the working individual would be 38% and not 100%:
RSA(h) = max(rmi(0)   h  w  0:38;0), while RMI(h) = max(rmi(0)   h  w;0).
The ￿rst set of rows provides the values of the parameters: the number of hours as a
26More precisely, the code has to solve for three asset values of employment, unemployment and
inactivity (v1-3), the value of  and e before the reform (v4-5), AM,   (v6-7), the number of employed
workers, of unemployed workers and of non-participants before the reform (v8-10), and the same en-
dogenous variables after the reform : three asset values of employment, unemployment and inactivity
(v11-13), the value of  and e after the reform (v14-15), and the number of employed workers, of unem-
ployed workers and of non-participants after the reform (v16-18). The code is perfectly identi￿ed since
we have three Bellman equations, one free-entry condition and one optimal e￿ort condition, 2 equations
for the steady-state stock of employment and unemployment and a third one for participation (1-the
sum of the two previous ones) : this leads to a total of 8 equations multiplied by two, before and after
the reform, that is 16), to which we add a target for unemployment before the reform (10.3) and a
target for the reduction in the job hazard rate from Table 2, column 1 (-0.07/4), a total of 18 equations.
29fraction of a full-time, the total wage and the various transfers, rmi(0) and rmi(h). For
the average worker, the amount of hours worked is such that the RMI yields no further
transfer. Under a di￿erent policy scenario with h = 0:5, this is not the case. In contrast,
the value of the RSA amounted to 0.094, arguably a sizeable fraction of the earnings.
The second set of rows in the table reports the calibrated parameters of interest. In
particular, the elasticity of e￿ort in the cost function is large (8.9). This will lead to
the disincentive e￿ects described above. The third set of rows reports the e￿ect of the
RMI on the main variables. E￿ort goes down with the RMI, as does employment and
the hazard rate of employment. In contrast, the RSA leads to higher e￿ort relative to
the RMI and mitigates the reduction in employment. We ￿nd that the RMI leads to an
increase in unemployment of 12.58-10.82=1.76 percentage points, while the RSA would
only have increased unemployment by 0.86 percentage points compared to the level in
absence of social transfers. In short, the increase from the RSA would have been only
half of what it was with the RMI.
The last set of rows provides additional calculations. The RMI leads to an increase in
the duration of unemployment by 5 months on average (2.66- 2.24 years) as compared to
2.5 months with the RSA (2.32 - 2.24 years). The last rows in the Table represent various
calculations related to the incentives to work. The row ’net gain from employment’
calculates the monetary gain from working in the absence of a transfer. It is 0.385 of
productivity, or 58% of a full-time wage (dividing 0.385 by 0.66). Taking into account
the transfers brought by the RMI, one can see that the net gain is much lower with the
RMI: it amounts to only 8.8% of productivity. However, the RSA provides additional
monetary gains, thus the gains of working increase signi￿cantly to approximately 18.2%
of productivity. The last two rows calculate the value of being unemployed and out
of the labor force. Both the RMI and the RSA led to an increase in the well-being of
inactive and unemployed agents. The gap between the two values for unemployment
and inactivity was large before the RMI (about 6 units), and fell to 1.4 units after the
RMI and about 3 units under the RSA.
6.4 Additional calibration results
Table 5 follows the same structure, under di￿erent scenarios. Columns (1-3) replicate
the analysis of Table 4, under the assumption that the marginal worker in the model
does not obtain a job with the average number of hours (31.5) but under the alternative
assumption that this marginal workers obtains a part-time job with h = 0:5. Qualita-
tively, the results of Table 4 are the same but the magnitude of the gains obtained for
the RSA are considerably larger than for the RMI. For instance, the rise in unemploy-
ment obtained here is still an increase by 1.76 percentage points, but the RSA limits
the rise to only 0.34 p.p.; that is 22% of the previous increase. The rise in the duration
of unemployment under the RMI is still 5 months on average; but the RSA would only
have increased the duration of unemployment by one month.
30Columns (4-6) use a di￿erent target group (single parents) for the calibration. We
estimate from the Labour Force Surveys the matrix of yearly ￿ows across the three labor
market states and, as previously, obtain a quarterly matrix and do some transformation
to account for infra-quarterly transition between inactivity and employment through
unemployment. We also change the number of hours worked to 28.8 (corresponding to
the summary statistics obtained for this group), that is a ratio h = 28:8=39 = 0:74.
Finally, we raise the value of the ￿xed part of the RMI (or the RSA) to account for the
change in the composition of the household: a second person in the household leads to
+50%, and a third person to +30%. The percentage change we apply to the maximum
transfer is therefore 80%, which is a conservative measure since the average number of
children of single parents is 2.87 in the sample. Unsurprisingly, the adverse e￿ects of the
RMI are pretty large: it has important disincentive e￿ects for this category of workers,
while the RSA would have led to practically no change in the employment outcome.
6.5 Calculations of the implied labor elasticities
The calibration parameters allow us to run an additional exercise: calculate the employ-
ment impact of a 1% increase in labor earnings. In the benchmak estimates of Table 3,
we obtain that the implied elasticity of search e￿ort to labor earnings is respectively 0.16
before the RMI, 0.68 after the RMI and 0.21 with the RSA. The reason is that, after
the implementation of the RMI, the di￿erence between income from activity and income
from inactivity is much lower, so that a 1% increase in the hourly wage (at ￿xed number
of hours) leads to a larger increase in search e￿ort than before the RMI where the gap
between the value of employment and the value of search is higher. The implementation
of the RSA reduces the elasticity, by widening the gap between the income from activity
and the income from inactivity.
Translated into employment and labor force participation, the elasticities are 0.15
and 0.21 after the implementation of the RMI. The implementation of the RSA reduces
them to 0.04 and 0.06 respectively. Overall however, the elasticities are in the range of
what is usually found in the literature (see e.g. the survey by Blundell and MacCurdy
1999, Table 1, where the uncompensated wage elasticity ranges between 0 and 0.79 for
most studies, with many values between 0.05 and 0.20).
7 Conclusion
Our paper uses an interesting natural experiment to obtain di￿erence-in-di￿erences esti-
mates of the impact of French welfare reform. We ￿nd strong disincentive e￿ects of the
RMI. Using the di￿erence-in-di￿erences estimates, we then calibrate a model and assess
the e￿ect of a major policy reform in 2007, the RSA, which provides additional income
to those who work without a￿ecting the unemployed. We ￿nd that the disincentive
31e￿ects are drastically reduced.
Our results are a ￿rst step toward integrating ex-post estimations of public policies
into ex-ante structural approaches, a fruitful research direction proposed by Attanazio
et al. (2003, 2009) and Todd and Wolpin (2009). This literature was developped to
address a common criticism of ex-ante policy evaluations: that structural coe￿cients
of interest may have changed after the reform due to general equilibrium e￿ects. In
part, our modelling strategy is immune to this critique. The estimates presented in our
calibrations deal precisely with general equilibrium e￿ects since our model allows for the
free entry of ￿rms. To account for general equilibrium e￿ects, we calibrate our model
using a di￿erence-in-di￿erences approach at the national level.
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p
l
e
i
s
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
o
s
e
2
5
-
5
5
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
1
)
i
s
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
i
s
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
,
"
0
"
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
i
s
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
(
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
0
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
i
n
a
l
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
T
h
e
s
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
a
r
e
e
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
f
o
r
t
h
e
R
M
I
i
n
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
y
e
a
r
o
f
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
f
t
h
e
y
r
e
m
a
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
.
T
h
e
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
i
s
"
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
"
,
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
r
e
s
i
d
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
"
0
"
i
f
h
e
r
e
s
i
d
e
s
i
n
A
l
s
a
c
e
-
M
o
s
e
l
l
e
,
a
n
d
a
s
e
c
o
n
d
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
,
"
0
"
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
T
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
n
a
l
l
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
￿
v
e
a
g
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
,
t
h
e
s
e
x
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
,
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
i
z
e
,
a
n
d
1
5
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
9
5
d
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
,
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
a
l
s
o
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
i
n
a
l
l
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
,
(
2
)
a
n
d
(
3
)
l
o
o
k
a
t
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
(
U
+
N
)
t
o
E
,
U
t
o
E
,
a
n
d
N
t
o
U
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
4
)
i
s
t
h
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
,
f
r
o
m
o
n
e
y
e
a
r
t
o
t
h
e
n
e
x
t
,
i
n
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
h
a
s
p
l
a
c
e
d
a
n
a
d
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
d
t
o
a
n
a
d
i
n
a
n
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r
o
r
o
n
a
n
o
t
i
c
e
-
b
o
a
r
d
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
4
)
i
s
t
h
e
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
(
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
0
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
i
n
a
l
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
a
n
d
(
6
)
l
o
o
k
a
t
t
h
e
s
t
o
c
k
s
o
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
a
n
d
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
7
)
i
s
t
h
e
w
a
g
e
.
I
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
5
)
,
(
6
)
,
a
n
d
(
7
)
,
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
s
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
u
n
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
h
i
g
h
s
c
h
o
o
l
d
r
o
p
o
u
t
s
)
.
36T
a
b
l
e
2
:
T
r
i
p
l
e
d
i
￿
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
2
5
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
U
+
N
)
t
o
E
U
t
o
E
N
t
o
U
S
e
a
r
c
h
E
U
W
a
g
e
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
1
i
f
E
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
1
i
f
E
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
1
i
f
U
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
S
e
a
r
c
h
e
￿
o
r
t
1
i
f
E
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
1
i
f
U
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
W
a
g
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
U
o
r
N
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
U
N
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
U
U
n
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
(
H
i
g
h
s
c
h
o
o
l
d
r
o
p
o
u
t
s
)
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
h
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
h
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
h
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
h
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
*
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
-
0
.
0
7
-
0
.
2
0
-
0
.
0
8
3
-
0
.
1
8
-
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
6
-
8
1
.
8
0
(
2
.
4
8
)
*
*
(
4
.
1
7
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
6
0
)
(
4
.
2
3
)
*
*
*
(
2
.
4
6
)
*
*
(
3
.
7
7
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
2
8
)
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
9
0
.
0
9
2
0
.
0
9
-
0
.
0
1
-
0
.
0
4
2
1
5
.
5
4
(
1
.
0
7
)
(
1
.
9
2
)
*
(
0
.
6
3
)
(
1
.
7
9
)
*
(
1
.
3
9
)
(
4
.
2
1
)
*
*
*
(
1
.
1
6
)
D
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
w
i
t
h
"
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
"
D
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
"
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
"
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
4
9
7
3
4
9
6
7
4
3
6
2
7
6
9
6
7
4
6
0
6
2
1
0
6
0
6
2
1
0
4
1
2
6
7
2
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
0
6
0
.
0
9
0
.
0
5
0
.
0
3
0
.
2
6
0
.
0
4
0
.
0
4
O
L
S
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
d
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
.
*
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
a
s
i
n
T
a
b
l
e
1
:
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
r
o
u
t
o
f
t
h
e
l
a
b
o
r
f
o
r
c
e
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
1
)
,
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
2
)
,
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
o
u
t
o
f
t
h
e
l
a
b
o
r
f
o
r
c
e
t
o
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
3
)
,
S
e
a
r
c
h
e
￿
o
r
t
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
4
)
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
5
)
,
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
6
)
,
a
n
d
w
a
g
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
7
)
.
￿
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
￿
i
s
a
n
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
r
e
s
i
d
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
"
0
"
i
f
h
e
r
e
s
i
d
e
s
i
n
A
l
s
a
c
e
-
M
o
s
e
l
l
e
,
a
n
d
a
s
e
c
o
n
d
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
,
"
0
"
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
T
h
e
c
o
e
￿
c
i
e
n
t
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
i
s
￿
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
*
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
￿
,
a
n
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
r
e
e
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
w
i
t
h
￿
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
￿
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
t
a
k
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
i
s
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
,
￿
0
￿
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
I
n
a
l
l
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
,
9
5
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
d
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
￿
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
￿
a
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
,
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
2
0
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
￿
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
￿
.
T
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
n
a
l
l
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
￿
v
e
a
g
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
,
t
h
e
s
e
x
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
,
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
i
z
e
,
a
n
d
1
5
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
.
37T
a
b
l
e
3
:
h
e
t
e
r
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
e
￿
e
c
t
s
a
c
r
o
s
s
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
s
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
(
U
+
N
)
t
o
E
:
"
1
"
i
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
,
"
0
"
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
,
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
(
2
0
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
U
o
r
N
-
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
h
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
B
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
P
a
r
t
t
i
m
e
F
u
l
l
t
i
m
e
S
i
n
g
l
e
p
e
r
s
o
n
s
S
i
n
g
l
e
p
a
r
e
n
t
s
C
o
u
p
l
e
s
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
C
o
u
p
l
e
s
w
i
t
h
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
c
h
i
l
d
r
e
n
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
*
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
-
0
.
0
7
-
0
.
1
0
0
.
0
1
-
0
.
2
5
-
0
.
2
2
0
.
1
5
-
0
.
0
6
(
2
.
4
8
)
*
*
(
4
.
2
2
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
5
9
)
(
0
.
9
7
)
(
3
.
1
8
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
4
6
)
(
1
.
0
0
)
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
8
-
0
.
0
4
0
.
2
3
0
.
1
5
-
0
.
2
2
0
.
0
3
(
1
.
0
7
)
(
3
.
3
5
)
*
*
*
(
1
.
9
7
)
*
(
0
.
8
8
)
(
1
.
8
4
)
*
(
0
.
6
9
)
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l
l
-
t
i
m
e
,
"
0
"
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
5
)
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
l
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
(
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
0
m
o
n
t
h
s
)
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
l
i
v
i
n
g
i
n
a
H
I
G
H
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
.
A
s
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
i
n
c
o
m
e
i
s
s
u
p
e
r
i
o
r
t
o
t
h
e
R
M
I
e
l
i
g
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
,
t
h
e
s
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
a
r
e
n
o
t
e
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
a
y
e
a
r
a
f
t
e
r
i
f
t
h
e
y
r
e
m
a
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
6
)
i
s
a
t
r
i
p
l
e
d
i
￿
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
.
T
h
e
c
o
e
￿
c
i
e
n
t
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
i
s
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
*
"
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
-
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
"
,
a
n
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
r
e
e
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
w
i
t
h
"
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
-
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
"
,
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
t
a
k
i
n
g
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
i
s
a
l
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
(
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
0
m
o
n
t
h
s
i
n
a
l
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
)
.
T
h
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
￿
v
e
a
g
e
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
,
t
h
e
s
e
x
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
,
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
i
z
e
,
1
5
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
,
9
5
d
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
,
a
n
d
2
0
y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
.
42A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
3
:
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
t
y
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
1
i
f
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
(
S
a
m
p
l
e
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
H
i
g
h
S
c
h
o
o
l
d
r
o
p
-
o
u
t
s
)
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
M
e
t
h
o
d
C
u
b
i
c
s
p
e
c
i
￿
c
a
t
i
o
n
L
o
c
a
l
l
i
n
e
a
r
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
F
a
l
s
i
￿
c
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
s
A
r
e
a
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
A
l
s
a
c
e
M
o
s
e
l
l
e
T
i
m
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
A
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
B
e
f
o
r
e
1
9
8
9
A
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
B
e
f
o
r
e
1
9
8
9
A
g
e
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
5
y
e
a
r
s
7
y
e
a
r
s
5
y
e
a
r
s
5
y
e
a
r
s
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
d
u
m
m
y
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
7
-
0
.
0
7
*
-
0
.
0
1
-
0
.
0
2
-
0
.
0
4
(
2
.
9
1
)
*
*
*
(
3
.
0
4
)
*
*
*
(
3
.
0
4
)
*
*
*
(
8
.
7
4
)
*
*
*
(
0
.
8
3
)
(
1
.
1
0
)
(
1
.
9
0
)
A
g
e
1
.
0
1
0
.
9
7
0
.
9
7
-
0
.
1
7
4
.
0
6
1
.
5
9
1
.
2
5
(
8
.
5
4
)
*
*
*
(
8
.
4
6
)
*
*
*
(
8
.
4
6
)
*
*
*
(
6
.
0
3
)
*
*
*
(
6
.
2
0
)
*
*
*
(
2
.
8
0
)
(
1
.
7
2
)
A
g
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
3
0
.
0
1
-
0
.
1
6
-
0
.
0
6
-
0
.
0
5
(
6
.
4
5
)
*
*
*
(
6
.
3
2
)
*
*
*
(
6
.
3
2
)
*
*
*
(
1
0
.
7
8
)
*
*
*
(
5
.
8
9
)
*
*
*
(
2
.
3
4
)
(
1
.
5
6
)
A
g
e
C
u
b
e
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
-
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
(
4
.
8
7
)
*
*
*
(
4
.
6
9
)
*
*
*
(
4
.
6
9
)
*
*
*
(
1
3
.
5
1
)
*
*
*
(
5
.
6
3
)
*
*
*
(
1
.
9
7
)
(
1
.
4
3
)
D
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
9
8
0
8
3
9
8
0
8
3
9
8
0
8
3
1
7
6
4
5
3
3
6
8
0
5
5
7
3
1
3
4
1
9
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
1
8
0
.
2
0
0
.
2
6
0
.
4
0
0
.
1
5
0
.
2
3
0
.
1
5
O
L
S
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
,
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
d
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
.
*
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
*
*
*
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
a
l
l
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
i
s
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
"
1
"
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
i
s
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
,
"
0
"
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
i
n
a
l
l
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
i
s
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
t
o
H
i
g
h
S
c
h
o
o
l
d
r
o
p
o
u
t
s
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
t
o
(
3
)
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
t
o
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
i
n
t
h
e
r
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
a
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
,
a
n
d
i
n
a
5
-
y
e
a
r
w
i
n
d
o
w
a
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
e
a
g
e
o
f
2
5
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
(
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
9
a
n
d
3
0
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
)
.
T
h
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
i
s
￿
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
d
u
m
m
y
￿
,
a
d
i
c
h
o
t
o
m
o
u
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
￿
1
￿
i
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
i
s
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
y
e
a
r
o
l
d
,
￿
0
￿
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
T
h
i
s
i
s
t
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
t
y
d
e
s
i
g
n
c
o
e
￿
c
i
e
n
t
.
A
g
e
,
a
g
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
,
a
n
d
a
g
e
a
r
e
a
l
s
o
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
2
)
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
d
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
,
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
3
)
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
(
t
h
e
s
e
x
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
,
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
i
z
e
,
a
n
d
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
)
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
4
)
e
x
p
a
n
d
s
t
h
e
w
i
n
d
o
w
t
o
7
y
e
a
r
s
a
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
e
a
g
e
o
f
2
5
y
e
a
r
s
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
5
)
u
s
e
s
l
o
c
a
l
l
i
n
e
a
r
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
t
y
d
e
s
i
g
n
c
o
e
￿
c
i
e
n
t
.
A
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
m
e
t
h
o
d
w
a
s
u
s
e
d
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
c
e
o
f
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
.
1
,
0
0
0
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
w
e
r
e
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
a
t
r
a
n
d
o
m
,
a
n
d
u
s
e
d
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
R
D
D
c
o
e
￿
c
i
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
l
o
c
a
l
l
i
n
e
a
r
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
i
s
w
a
s
r
e
p
e
a
t
e
d
1
0
0
t
i
m
e
s
.
T
h
e
c
o
e
￿
c
i
e
n
t
i
s
d
e
e
m
e
d
s
i
g
n
i
￿
c
a
n
t
l
y
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
t
x
%
i
f
i
t
i
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
x
%
o
f
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
s
.
F
a
l
s
i
￿
c
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
s
a
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
i
n
c
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
6
)
t
o
(
8
)
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
6
)
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
t
o
H
i
g
h
S
c
h
o
o
l
d
r
o
p
o
u
t
s
,
i
n
t
h
e
r
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
b
e
f
o
r
e
1
9
8
9
,
a
n
d
i
n
a
5
-
y
e
a
r
w
i
n
d
o
w
a
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
e
a
g
e
o
f
2
5
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
(
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
9
a
n
d
3
0
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
)
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
7
)
t
o
(
8
)
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
t
o
H
i
g
h
S
c
h
o
o
l
d
r
o
p
o
u
t
s
,
i
n
a
5
-
y
e
a
r
w
i
n
d
o
w
a
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
e
a
g
e
o
f
2
5
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
(
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
9
a
n
d
3
0
y
e
a
r
s
o
l
d
)
,
i
n
A
l
s
a
c
e
-
M
o
s
e
l
l
e
,
a
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
7
)
)
,
a
n
d
b
e
f
o
r
e
1
9
8
9
(
c
o
l
u
m
n
(
8
)
)
.
43A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
T
a
b
l
e
4
:
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
S
e
a
r
c
h
:
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
j
o
b
S
e
a
r
c
h
:
d
e
m
a
n
d
i
n
g
1
i
f
E
,
0
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
L
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
U
o
r
N
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
L
o
w
i
n
c
o
m
e
h
h
A
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
,
B
e
f
o
r
e
2
0
0
0
A
f
t
e
r
2
0
0
0
a
y
e
a
r
b
e
f
o
r
e
R
e
s
t
O
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
1
9
8
9
*
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
-
0
.
0
4
-
0
.
0
7
(
0
.
8
8
)
(
1
.
4
3
)
R
e
s
t
o
f
F
r
a
n
c
e
*
A
f
t
e
r
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
7
(
1
.
7
2
)
*
(
0
.
9
8
)
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
d
u
m
m
y
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
4
(
2
.
8
7
)
*
*
*
(
1
.
8
0
)
*
A
g
e
0
.
8
6
1
.
6
0
(
6
.
6
6
)
*
*
*
(
7
.
2
8
)
*
*
*
A
g
e
s
q
u
a
r
e
-
0
.
0
3
-
0
.
0
6
(
4
.
7
3
)
*
*
*
(
6
.
1
8
)
*
*
*
A
g
e
C
u
b
e
0
.
0
0
0
.
0
0
(
3
.
2
6
)
*
*
*
(
5
.
3
5
)
*
*
*
D
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
a
r
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
w
i
t
h
"
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
"
D
e
p
a
r
t
e
m
e
n
t
￿
x
e
d
e
￿
e
c
t
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
"
M
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
2
5
"
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
5
9
1
4
5
9
1
9
8
1
0
2
0
1
7
0
6
3
R
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
0
.
0
6
0
.
0
7
0
.
2
0
0
.
1
8
O
L
S
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
R
o
b
u
s
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Bellman equations with full information
Starting from
rE = e + s(U   E) + sN(N   E)
rU = u + (p  e)(E   U)
rN = (U   N)
with
e = hw + rmi(h)    (h)
u = rmi(0)    (e)
we take the di￿erence between the ￿rst and the second equation and between the ￿rst and the third,
we obtain:
(r + s + ep)(E   U) = e   u + sN(N   E)
(r + sN + )(E   N) = e + (s   )(U   E)
Inserting E   N of the second equation into the ￿rst one, we have further:
(r + s + ep)(E   U) = e   u
+
sN
r + sN + 
[ e + (s   )(E   U)]
or
E   U =
r+
r+sN+e   u
r + s + ep + sN
r+sN+(   s)
(6)
Hence, the smaller the gap in income between employment and unemployment, the lower the gap
in asset values. In particular, the move from a situation where rmi(h)  0 for all hours to a situation
where it is positive and decreasing in hours lead to a reduction in the di￿erence between E and U.
Proof of Proposition 1, second part on e.
Going back to the ￿rst order condition we have, replacing the value of (E   U) by that of equation
(6):
 0(e) = p
r+
r+sN+e   u
r + s + ep + sN
r+sN+(   s)
(7)
The left-hand side is the marginal utility of leisure, it is thus increasing in e￿ort e. The right hand
side is a decreasing function of e, moreover decreasing when rmi(.) is positive. Hence the proof of the
second part of Proposition 1: there is a unique value of e￿ort e satisfying 7 and a shift in  reduces
search e￿ort. See also Figure 5.1.1.
Stock-￿ow equations with full information
Using the value of NU from the text, we can also compute NN. We have
NU =
1
1 + A
NN =
sN
 + sN
A
1 + A
45where
A =
ep

 + sN
s + sN
Hence, the active population is
1   NN =
 + sN
1
1+A
 + sN
and the rate of unemployment is
u =
NU
1   NN
=
1
1 +
ep()
s+sN
Six-￿ows ergodic unemployment rate
The ergodic unemployment rate is
dU=dt = E:eu + N:nu   U:(ue + un) (8)
dE=dt = N:ne + U:ue   E:(eu + en) (9)
dN=dt = E:en + U:un   N:(ne + nu) (10)
The stationary rate of unemployment is reached when E, N and U are constant: this is the rate of
unemployment corresponding to the ergodic distribution of workers in the three states.
De￿nition 4 The ergodic rate of unemployment is given by:
u =
eu:ne + eu:nu + en:nu
eu:ne + eu:nu + en:nu + ue:ne + ue:nu + ne:un
(11)
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